The contested rise of a modernist technology politics by Schot, Johan
This chapter explores the idea that as part of a modernization process
that gained speed in the nineteenth and twentieth century in the western
world, a typical modernist practice of technology politics emerged.1 The
concepts of modernization and modernity need to be handled with care,
of course, since their use may easily lead to an identification with mod-
ernizers, actors who have invented and used these labels to advance
their cause. In addition, using these concepts for analysis might lead to
finalism, as if past developments have led right up to the present. When
these two pitfalls are avoided, the concepts of modernization and
modernity are useful categories to discuss various structural changes in
western societies since the eighteenth century. The concept of modern-
ization refers to a new mode of social organization, a new social order,
and a discontinuity in history (Wehler 1975; Giddens 1990). It is best
understood as a process associated with a specific time period (eigh-
teenth century to the twentieth century) and geographical location (the
western world). The concept of modernity furthermore refers to a spe-
cific mode of thinking in which technology is identified as the main way
of advancing the modernization process. Technology has been far more
central to the making of modernity than is usually recognized (Brey,
chapter 2, this volume; Hård and Jamison 1998; Latour 1993).
The modernist politics that slowly emerged consists of separating the
promotion of technology from the regulation of technology. In this
practice, technology development is perceived as a neutral, value-free
process that needs to be protected and nurtured (because it creates
progress, material wealth, health, etc.). Special “free places,” often
called laboratories, are created where engineers, inventors, and other
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technology developers can focus on solving technical problems. If these
problems are solved, technologies begin their journey to the “real
world.” Fitting technologies into a market is the business of entrepre-
neurs (innovators).
Sometimes, as the modernist politics recognizes, these technologies
will have undesirable impacts for society. To help societies deal with
these impacts, government or other bodies put into place regulations to
protect and if necessary compensate citizens. These undesirable impacts,
in the modernist view, are unrelated to the choice of a technology. The
modernist view does not recognize an important feature of technical
change, the co-production of technology and its effects. The social ef-
fects of any technology depend crucially on the way impacts are actively
sought or avoided by the actors involved in its development. In the mod-
ernist view, impacts are perceived as acceptance problems. Hence, tech-
nology promoters devote substantial resources to persuading the public
to adopt a “better understanding” of the issues at stake. Technology
promoters do test their innovations and if necessary modify them to fit
with the regulatory system and the worldviews of the public. However,
the modernist style of regulation does not require technology developers
to consider impacts and “impact” constituencies systematically, let
alone at an early stage, while technologies are undergoing development
and taking on their durable forms. The emergence of this modernist
technology politics went hand in hand with the development of a di-
chotomized discourse on technology. Reinforcing the modernist practice
of promoting and regulating new technologies was the emergence of two
dominant perspectives: an instrumental one in which technology is a
neutral means toward an end, to be defined outside the technical area
and, by contrast, a strong critique asking for (regulatory) limitations on
technical action.2
This essay first explores the rise of this modernist technology politics,
spotlighting key turning points from the early nineteenth to the mid-
twentieth centuries, and then suggests ways to go beyond such a di-
chotomous politics. My ultimate aim is to identify ways to open up
space for the actual shaping of technology and for discourses on how to
manage technology in society. In my discussion of the rise of the mod-
ernist technology politics, I particularly focus on episodes of resistance
6641 CH09 UG  9/12/02  6:20 PM  Page 258
The Contested Rise of a Modernist Technology Politics 259
to technology. There are both substantial and methodological reasons
for doing so. The emergence of the modernist regime of technology
management was highly contested and it is important to make this con-
tested process visible, particularly because the notion of modernization
can easily lead the author (and reader) to the pitfall of finalism and the
writing of whiggish history. Resistance is also interesting for method-
ological reasons because various kinds of positions can be more easily
found in source material.
This essay is an attempt to construct a plausible account of a mod-
ernist regime of technology management. It is a broad-ranging and 
interpretative attempt to bring together diverse material to form a mean-
ingful and coherent story. It can also be read as an attempt to bring to-
gether my background in social history, sociology of technology, and
policy studies, together with my practical experience in several technol-
ogy-policy networks.3 It draws on systematic reflections resulting from
circulating in various networks and disciplines. The argument is, there-
fore, speculative, but a starting point for further research and discussion
on the relation between modernity and technology.
Politics and Innovation in Early Modern Europe
In the early modern period, a distinct technological domain did not
exist. Technological development was embedded in religious, economic,
and social practices, and it was assessed against social norms. The as-
sessment processes, which were often informal, took place in guilds, for
example. While guilds often slowed down specific innovations, they
were not against all forms of technological development; they hindered
only those technologies that were contrary to their ideas about the
“good society,” for example, machines that would threaten skill or em-
ployment. Technological development was heavily influenced by the reg-
ulatory (and evaluative) practices of guilds (Mokyr 1990: pp. 258–289).
It was also shaped by a variety of protests, such as organized demon-
strations, petitions, threats to inventors and entrepreneurs, and breaking
machines (Rule 1986).
The destruction of machines is associated with the acts of the Lud-
dites, the English workers who destroyed textile machines in the early
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nineteenth century.4 For decades, the Luddites were held up as irrespon-
sible if unwitting technophobes. Historians once viewed them as the vic-
tims of progress, who saw no other recourse than taking out their
aggression on the machine. Often, it was added, every new technology is
resisted because of vested interests, but that resistance eventually sub-
sides. Hobsbawm (1952), Thompson (1963), Rule (1986), and Randall
(1991) have corrected this mistaken image of the Luddites. According to
their research, organized machine breaking had been a rather popular
and successful form of protest since the seventeenth century. It was
more effective than striking because employers could not employ scabs
to keep the machines in operation. Hobsbawm called it “collective bar-
gaining by riot.” In saving the Luddites from modernistic criticisms,
these revisionist historians have sometimes argued that the Luddites’
protests were not directed against technical change or machines. I would
like to argue, however, that their protest did entail a strong criticism of
technology. Their critical stance was not based, however, on disdain for
technology in general. On the contrary, it was directed at particular ma-
chines. The only machines the Luddites destroyed were the ones against
which the workers had particular grievances. Other machines, even in
the same factory, were left unscathed. A crucial point that is often lost in
the popular image of the Luddites as an uninformed antimachine mob is
that most Luddites were skilled machine operators in their own shops.
Moreover, I would like to emphasize that the Luddites’ resistance ran
much deeper than the rejection of particular machines. It concerned the
rise of a new kind of society, embodied in a new set of specific machines,
in which employers had the right to introduce machines that made
workers redundant, produced unemployment, and lowered the quality
of the products and the quality of society. Randall, who carefully ana-
lyzed the discourses used by various workers, argues, rightfully, that the
workers were not just trying to restore an old situation (Randall 1991).
Rather, they acted proactively to develop their own view of the future, a
future that in their time was a genuine and feasible alternative. It was a
struggle between rival models of how to organize society. The Luddites
demanded that those who introduced new machines should anticipate
their social effects. One of the Luddites’ proposals was a machine tax in-
tended to create fair competition between the power loom and the hand
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loom (see Berg 1980). In other cases, workers asked for a negotiated in-
troduction of machinery. They proposed an experimental period to as-
sess social costs and social benefits (Randall 1991: pp. 72–74). Some
evidence exists that attempts were made to construct “intermediate”
machines, which would need more hands and skills; in addition, certain
machines were available for small-scale domestic manufacture. Two
such cases from the cotton textile sector, which would benefit from
economies of scale, are James Hargreaves’s “jenny” and Richard Ark-
wright’s water frame, which was deployed on a large factory scale be-
cause of patent-law considerations even though it had been developed
initially for small-scale domestic use.5
To the employers and entrepreneurs, as well as the politically domi-
nant classes in Britain, the Luddites were criminals. Labeling machine
breaking a criminal act was, however, part of the struggle of developing
a specific kind of industrial society. Initially the Luddites had English
law on their side, for machine breaking as a form of protest was legiti-
mated by the common law. Only in 1769 did the Parliament pass a new
law against machine breaking. Luddites were not alone in their dissent.
They were supported by craftsmen, small-time entrepreneurs, and con-
servative politicians (Randall 1991), the last of whom were strongly in-
fluenced by early Romantic authors such as Carlyle and Southey (Berg
1980: chap. 11). Finally, Luddite resistance must be seen against the
background of the national debate on the “machinery question.” This
debate centered on the sources of technical progress and the impact of
new technologies on the economy and society. It spurred the develop-
ment of a new discipline, political economy (Berg 1980).
The Luddites lost their battle in the end, partly as a result of strong
state intervention. During a wave of protests in 1811–13, some 12,000
soldiers—a force much larger than Wellington’s army then fighting
Napoleon at Waterloo—were sent against the workers to “restore
order” in the textile regions of England. While the Luddite movement
was destroyed, it can be argued that it slowed the introduction of a
number of machines, particularly in the woolen industry, and the
threshing machine in agriculture (through the so-called Swing riots). In
this way the workers bought time to adjust to the changes.6 However,
the main outcome was the emergence of a new ideology and practice
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that granted inventors and entrepreneurs near-complete freedom to in-
troduce new machines into society without having to think about their
effects.
The replacement of the early-modern order by a new industrial order,
including a new relationship between politics and technology, was an in-
tegral part of industrialization in many western European countries.
Ken Alder has argued that in France during the French Revolution engi-
neers pioneered and founded new institutional structures to control and
discipline the productive order (Alder 1997, see especially the introduc-
tion and chap. 8; for the French case see also Rosenband 20007). The
French Revolution was not initiated in the name of the factory, but it
was supported by engineers seeking to create institutional forms to regu-
late production, especially to enforce forms of industrial and factory
production. As in the case of England, these attempts met fierce resis-
tance from labor and petty commodity producers. For example, in
Saint-Etienne in 1789 a crowd of armorers, with the municipality’s con-
sent, destroyed a factory that aimed at mechanized barrel forging with
trip-hammers (Alder 1997: pp. 214–215). When the Revolution turned
violent, engineers, to keep their heads attached to their bodies, learned
to position themselves as neutral, not involved in politics.8 (Historians
largely accepted this view in subsequent decades, obscuring the relation-
ship between the industrial and political revolutions in France.) This
neutral position led to the development of a new strategy, one in which
engineers became licensed experts of the state responsible for controlling
the productive order.
In many European countries persistent resistance to new technologies
became obsolete, condemned, and perceived as reactionary. Romantic
thinkers, who had struggled to construct a political vision that allowed
innovation while protecting society against some of the impacts of new
machinery, made a utopian turn after the French Revolution and the
dreadful experience of the English industrialization (Sieferle 1984). The
machinery question was “solved” through the gradual acceptance of the
instrumental vision by all parties during the course of the nineteenth
century. Leading spokesmen of all major political parties and most in-
terest groups agreed on a consensus in which technological innovation
was acclaimed as a progressive force. Even radical reformers (such as
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Owen), and later Marxists and socialists, came to share this instrumen-
tal vision. These radicals argued that social problems must not be asso-
ciated with the machine itself, but with the machine’s use in a capitalist
context. Owenites argued, for example, that machinery used in a coop-
erative social context would benefit labor since the productivity gains
following mechanization could be redistributed to the working class
(Berg 1980: p. 270).9 By the end of the nineteenth century, modernist
technology politics was firmly in place. The elite (the right wing as well
as the left wing, employers as well as unions and intellectuals) almost
automatically condemned resistance to new technology as reactionary.
Testing and Celebrating Modernization
One of the few violent outbursts of resistance to the machine in the
early twentieth century took place in the Netherlands. In 1905 grain ele-
vators (unloaders) were introduced at Rotterdam harbor. These eleva-
tors were large suction devices that conveyed grain from one ship to
another almost without human intervention. Thousands of dockwork-
ers, who had worked carrying sacks of grain, were to lose their jobs.
When the first grain ships were unloaded, the automatic weighing did
not work; its indications were too high. In the 6 weeks it took to repair
this, the dockworkers organized themselves. When the unloaders were
ready to start working again, they called a strike. This strike was a great
success, blocking almost the entire grain transshipment. When the Ger-
man grain importers heard about the strike, they negotiated a contract
with the labor leaders and the factors, the importers’ local representa-
tives in the harbor, to accept only grain that had been weighed by hand.
As a result, the unloader company could not find enough work for their
two unloaders. For two years the elevators remained dormant.
In 1907 the unloader company began once again unloading grain
ships with the elevators, provoking another strike, but this time the
workers, with their strike funds depleted, could not win. The employers,
including the factors, had united and had recruited strikebreaking scabs
from all over the Netherlands and from Germany. Rotterdam’s ma-
yor proclaimed a state of siege; warships appeared in the harbor; and
military troops were called out to preserve order. More elevators were
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introduced and many jobs were lost. By 1912 sixteen unloaders were on
duty, handling 90 percent of the harbor’s flow of grain.10
In this pitched conflict, conducted not only by striking workers but
also in a wide public debate, it is curious that the obvious technology
choices involved in elevator design did not come under discussion.11
Union and socialist leaders embraced the new technology and argued it
would bring progress to the harbor. Machine breaking, condemned as
Luddism, was not on the agenda. The union and socialist leaders end-
lessly repeated the message, familiar from Marx and Owen, that any
problems were not due to technology but to its uses under capitalism. In
the new socialist society, the tremendous productive forces built up
under capitalism would be employed for the benefit of all: “our watch-
word should not be ‘away with machinery’ but ‘away with the capital-
ists and capital to the workers’ ” (see van Lente 1998a: pp. 93–94). One
prominent socialist leader even argued that losing strikes against new
machinery was in the best interest of the working classes.
Representatives of the broad-based anarchist movement, probably
representing a larger part of the laborers, however, denounced the tech-
nological determinism implied in the views of the union and socialist
leaders. Much like the Luddites a century before in England, the anar-
chist movement viewed the harbor as a community in which the em-
ployers had no right to impose, without negotiation, a machine that
would deprive hundreds of workers of their daily bread. They also de-
nied the economic necessity of the unloaders, without rejecting labor-
saving machinery in general. Research in the minutes of the meetings of
grain traders has proven that this view was, remarkably enough, shared
initially by a number of grain traders and employers (see van Driel and
Schot 2001). However, when the conflict hardened, the grain traders re-
defined the conflict into one about who controls the harbor and the in-
troduction of new machinery, and closed ranks with those arguing for
the economic necessity of elevators.
The consensus among the Dutch elite and part of the labor force on
the instrumental role of technology in society was certainly challenged
by labor in the elevator conflict during 1905–7. Yet the instrumental
view emerged stronger than ever. In this period, the instrumental vision
was also challenged in different ways in a number of European countries
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and the United States (Hård and Jamison 1998). After 1870 in a number
of European countries it was impossible to ignore some of the problems
associated with the introduction of new machines, such as bad hygiene
in cities, child labor, and accidents involving machinery. “New liberals”
started to write extensively about the social consequences of industrial-
ization. They argued that these problems should not be attributed to in-
dustrialization itself, but to human ignorance and immorality, obsolete
institutions, and outmoded laws. Social legislation could solve these
problems. These issues were part of the “social question,” which would
dominate discussions.
In Germany the social question took the form of a machinery ques-
tion, partly as a result of the dreadful experience of World War I. In
Germany, one had to come to grips with wartime chaos and postwar de-
pression. Technology became a much-debated issue (see Hård 1998;
Dierkes et al. 1990; Herf 1984). To summarize, technology was seen as
important for creating order and control, but only in a modified form.
Technical change needed organization and control and regulation by the
state, and the creation of domestic monopolies to guide its implementa-
tion. For example, Sombart argued that the government must appoint a
body to decide what new inventions should be developed. He also ar-
gued that the police must prohibit the use of technologies with negative
consequences for citizens and workers. He approved the decision of the
Swiss canton of Graubünden to ban the use of automobiles and motor-
cycles (Hård 1998: p. 62). These modifications would make technology
part of the German Kultur. Whereas U.S. technology was part of cor-
rupt western Zivilisation, German appropriation would transform tech-
nology into an order-bringing and Kultur-enhancing mechanism. A
number of influential authors (Schweitzer, Sombart, Rathenau, and
Spengler) argued, in various ways, for a German Sonderweg (loosely,
“alternative path”) in technical change.
Generally, participants in the German debates considered moderniza-
tion to be desirable, but thought that its consequences should be con-
trolled and regulated, either by engineers or sociologists. Modernization
could thus become controlled modernization. In the debates, it is clear
that for Sombart and others, technology was not an autonomous realm
of society; it could be shaped and fitted into the German context. 
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Sombart used the notion of “cultural carpet” to analyze the relationship
between technology and other spheres of society, suggesting that Ger-
many could develop its own style and combination of technology and
society (Hård 1998: p. 58).
Even though some figures proposed a new kind of technology politics
(Dessauer 1958) that would exert more control over technology, the
outcome of the German debates reconfirmed the modernistic technology
politics: state intervention might accommodate the embedding of tech-
nologies in society (for example, with safety regulations), but there
could be no direct intervention in the innovation process itself. Even
Sombart eventually accepted the instrumental view. He argued in 1934
that “technology is always culturally neutral and morally indifferent; 
it may serve either the good or the bad,” a definition that, rather jar-
ringly, does not fit his earlier use of the notion of cultural carpet (Hård
1998: p. 63).12
A wave of technological enthusiasm in the early twentieth century
stiffened the modernistic consensus about the apolitical role of technol-
ogy in society. People started to refer to “technology” in the singular—
an independent and abstract phenomenon that transcended its many
individual fields of application (Marx 1994; Oldenziel 1999). Technol-
ogy became the very symbol of modern society. The belief in the techni-
cal fix, in shaping a new society by means of modern technology, assumed
unprecedented proportions. Social and cultural advances through tech-
nology appeared limitless. This belief became visible in several techno-
cratic movements in many western European countries and the United
States. Their objective was to promote the prosperity of the people,
through the use and implementation of technology. In art and architec-
ture, the new belief in technology led to the emergence of new move-
ments, such as Futurism and De Stijl. These movements celebrated the
coming of the machine as a new joyful age. Theo van Doesburg, one of
the leading figures in De Stijl, heralded the new age as follows:
You long for wildernesses and fairy tales? I will show you the order of engine
rooms and the fairy tale of modern production methods. Each product is a real
miracle. You long for heaven? I will show you the ascension of the aeroplane
with its quiet pilot. You long for nature? Her dead body is at your feet. You
have beaten her yourself. Your high mountains have changed into skyscrapers.
Your windmill is no longer turning—a chimney has taken its place. Across the
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place once occupied by your stage-coach, now an automobile is zooming along.
(Quoted in Anbeek 1994: p. 123)
Technological enthusiasm was pervasive in this period (Hughes 1989:
chap. 7). This enthusiasm was not only widespread among the elite of
engineers, scientists, architects, and artists, but also in the world of busi-
ness, social organizations, and among citizens. The enthusiasm was em-
bodied most clearly at the New York World’s Fair of 1939, which
presented “The World of Tomorrow” (see Nye 1990: pp. 368–379). In
this world technology was presented as the key instrument of a better
society. The fair was explicitly and consciously concerned with selling
the vision of a technology-driven and technology-based future. Technol-
ogy would fix many of the world’s problems, including hunger, disease,
scarcity, and war. That 45 million people attended this fair indicated
how much the instrumental (and enthusiastic) view of technology had
captured the feelings of a larger part of the American people.
The Coming of Reflexive Modernization
Although World War II showed again that death could be efficiently
mass produced by technology, technological enthusiasm prevailed for at
least two decades after 1945, in Europe as well as in the United States.
These were the decades of Big Science, and after two decades of hard-
ship during depression and war, consumer society finally became a real-
ity for all, including labor and Europe. Science and technology were
seen as the key to American prosperity, the rebuilding of Europe, and
the future of the world. In the 1960s, however, people began to find,
somewhat to their surprise, that new products can have serious prob-
lems, so-called unintended consequences. Various citizens’ groups, non-
government organizations (NGOs), and intellectuals, such as Commoner,
Ellul, Mumford, Nader, Marcuse, and Roszak, started to challenge the
promise that science and technology could solve any problem (see, for
example, Nelkin 1979; Hughes 1989: chap. 9; Eyerman and Jamison
1991; Bauer 1995).
Overt resistance against new technologies, especially nuclear energy,
flourished, effectively frustrating its further development in the 1970s.
New social movements reversed modernism’s trust in technology by 
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issuing critical calls for values such as quality of life, wholeness, small-
ness, care for nature, and concern for future generations. The attempts
by governments and companies to improve “public understanding”
were seen as defensive and self-serving. This distrust was not only fueled
by accidents and other impacts of technology that became visible, but
also by a critique of centralized large-scale technologies. The various
controversies and disputes were not merely about the impacts them-
selves, but also were about wider social and moral preferences and val-
ues (see Irwin 1995; Irwin and Wynne 1996).
Not only was resistance against new technologies reinvented, the idea
of developing alternative systems and technologies consonant with the
new value system became popular. In 1973 E. F. Schumacher published
Small Is Beautiful: Economics As if People Matter, in which he advo-
cated a latter-day “intermediate technology.” In 1977 appropriate tech-
nology in the United States received official sanction in a new National
Center for Appropriate Technology. The Army Corps of Engineers was
ordered to identify dams that might be retrofitted to low-head 
hydroelectric production. Many programs for research and development
on renewable energy were set up (Pursell 1995: chap. 13, 1993). 
Particularly in Denmark, small-scale wind energy was developed and
used successfully (Jørgensen and Karnøe 1995). Many examples of so-
called clean technologies emerged during these years (Green and Irwin
1996).
In addition to the development of more appropriate and cleaner tech-
nologies, western societies since the 1970s have witnessed an explosion
of new governmental regulations as well as a huge increase in knowl-
edge about environmental problems and solutions. The consequences of
new technologies have been increasingly assessed, monitored, and regu-
lated. Also, these consequences (dangers, risks, impacts) began to domi-
nate public and political debates. For this reason Ulrich Beck has argued
that we have entered a new phase in the modernization process, a phase
of reflexive modernization in which industrial society confronts its own
problems (Beck 1992, 1994). Thus “reflexive” does not refer merely to
reflection, but foremost to self-confrontation.
Still, although western societies seem to recognize their problems, a
solution to them is not at hand. Alternative technologies, such as wind
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energy, organic farming, and electric vehicles occupy only small market
niches, while many “clean” technologies, from the chimney filter to the
catalytic converter, do not solve the problem, but only displace it and
create new problems elsewhere. Regulation is often not very effective,
while the promotion of new, risky technologies such as genetic engineer-
ing continues, and many problematic old technologies such as gasoline-
fueled automobiles flourish. No clear picture has emerged on how to
effectively handle even widely recognized problems. This leads for some
to an uneasiness; for example, people still drive automobiles but feel a
bit guilty about it. For others, the intractability of these problems leads
to apathy and indifference.
The case of the expansion of the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport serves
here to illustrate the strains of reflexive modernization and the persis-
tence and limitations of modernist technology politics. In this case the
dual-track approach of separating promotion and regulation was clearly
articulated and codified in official policy, even as the defects of this pol-
icy became clear to many parties involved.
In 1969 the director of Schiphol Airport made a plea for a large ex-
pansion of the airport, particularly the construction of a fifth runway.13
A long battle ensued between the national government, the provincial
government, and various local municipalities, against a background of
organized resistance by a variety of local communities and environmen-
tal groups. During this battle, the number of flights at Schiphol in-
creased dramatically and the airport itself was expanded, but permission
to build a new runaway was repeatedly delayed until February 1995. In
these years, many studies—including a so-called integral environmental
impact statement—were done to explore, determine, and calculate all
the impacts. The national government’s decision to allow the construc-
tion of a fifth runway was part of a broader policy for the airport. Ac-
cording to this policy, Schiphol would be allowed to grow, albeit within
certain limits set by noise standards. The number of residences to be af-
fected by serious noise pollution was set at a maximum of ten thousand.
This policy was labeled a “dual decision,” and defended as a policy that
would achieve competing economic and environmental goals.
This “dual decision” was developed by a project group that included
the airport managers, municipal administrators, and various national
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ministries, who arrived at that consensus before commencement of the
formal decision-making procedures, including a public inquiry. Conse-
quently, citizens’ groups and various NGOs distrusted the ensuing
process of public participation from the start. The “dual decision” has
dominated the political debate since 1995. Discussions range from such
issues as how to measure noise effects to which types of runway configu-
ration would allow steady growth with the least noise. Resistance also
continued, as citizens and NGOs tried to slow down the process of
building a fifth runway. These efforts have met with some successes;
namely, court appeals and other actions such as the refusal to sell land
needed for the expansion of the airport (which was preemptively bought
up by activists before the airport started to buy the needed land).
The drive to expand the airport cannot be understood merely in terms
of a growing need for air travel. The expansion of Schiphol is a part of
the story of the Netherlands as “the Gateway to Europe,” distributing
goods and people. This story is particularly forceful in the Dutch con-
text because it reconnects the present to the Golden Age of the seven-
teenth century, when Holland and especially Amsterdam was the hub of
international trade. In this storyline, resistance to growth and a growing
transport sector is viewed as resistance to progress, a sound economy,
and to a core cause of Dutch prosperity.
In the debates since the end of the 1960s, environmental groups and
local communities have hammered home the adverse environmental ef-
fects of expansion and trivialized the appeal to national economic inter-
est. These critics pointed at airplanes contributing to the greenhouse
effect, overuse of space, noise production, congestion of automobiles
around the airport, and safety problems. (In 1992 an airplane crashed
into an Amsterdam neighborhood, killing 47 people.) They called for
stricter norms and limits to growth. At the same time, they attempted to
develop alternatives. For example, they proposed a much smaller airport
that would not accommodate so many transit passengers flying to the
rest of Europe (such transit passengers, it was argued, contribute little
added value to the Netherlands). A fierce debate among economists has
persisted over the calculations of the added value of the airport expan-
sion. NGOs developed the idea of a “railport,” whereby passengers
bound for Frankfurt, Paris, and other European cities would be forced
6641 CH09 UG  9/12/02  6:20 PM  Page 270
The Contested Rise of a Modernist Technology Politics 271
to continue travel by rail. They also hinted at options for integrating air
transport into a broader, multimodal transport policy.
Other critics argued that the only way out is not to start with technol-
ogy. Real solutions will only come from social and cultural change, to
be enforced through regulation. The way forward, in this view, is
through restricting mobility (through price mechanisms that make jet
fuel much more expensive, creating a new tax on flying, or enforcing
mobility quotas). The management of Schiphol Airport hardly re-
sponded to these ideas, other than by pointing at the growth in the num-
ber of flights and the competition among European airports, forcing
Schiphol to grow as fast as possible. At the same time, airport planners
did incorporate a train station in the construction plans for an expanded
airport. Also, a number of successful measures were taken to reduce the
airport’s energy use.
In the prolonged Schiphol controversy, economic growth was dis-
cussed simultaneously with risk production and risk distribution. Risks
were made visible, and attempts were made to measure and predict
them; this is a key element of reflexive modernization. Also, the two
tracks of promotion and regulation—identified in this essay as the mod-
ernist way of handling technology in society—were explicitly labeled in
the “dual decision” governmental policy. However, the attempts to inte-
grate the risks into a policy did not lead to a viable solution that was ac-
ceptable to the range of actors. This suggests limits to the modernist
technology politics. How can we explain this lack of room for negotiat-
ing a solution?
The Schiphol case is an exemplar for many other “risk issues” (BSE
[so-called mad cow disease], food toxins, nuclear threats, global warm-
ing). The failure to resolve these issues, it seems, deepens the distrust
and alienation experienced by many citizens. Following my analysis of
the rise of a modernistic technology politics, we can see two phenomena
at play. First, no space or arena for collaboration, discussion, and medi-
ation on how to deal with the impacts of technology was available.14
Second, no discourse was readily available to the participants so they
could understand the relationships between technology choice and tech-
nology impact. A feeling of shared responsibility between producers of
new systems and those who use or are affected by them cannot emerge
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in such a situation. Typically, only those acting to promote it have any
access to decision making about a future technology, system develop-
ment, and the attendant impacts, leaving ample room for viewing pro-
moters as the “bad guys” seeking only profit.
In the Schiphol case, public participation, which is often held out as a
robust solution to such conflicts, did not result in any substantial access
or choice of technology. The national government tried several times to
create a “roundtable” to discuss the future of the airport with varied ac-
tors, but these attempts failed because of the airport’s low institutional
credibility and the lack of common ground for discussion. The airport
management continued to perceive a binary choice—Schiphol could re-
main a regional airport or it could become a huge international one,
which would require a fifth runway. Opponents of the airport expan-
sion viewed airport growth and the construction of a fifth runway as the
problem. For them, system growth needed to be curtailed through strict
regulation that might change the travel patterns of passengers.
Solutions to the Schiphol impasse were thus sought in either a “tech-
nology” fix or a “regulation” fix. As I have argued, both approaches are
deeply embedded in our culture and dominate the debate about many
technological systems. The key issue my analysis raises is whether mod-
ern societies are indeed trapped within these two conflicting positions.
Would it be possible to conceive of a modern culture able to discuss
contending social and cultural issues in relation to technology? This
leads to the related question of what conditions would encourage and
allow actors to work on both the technical and the social simultane-
ously, in a related way.
Contours of a Constructive Technology Politics
The core of modernist technology politics, as I have argued, lies in the
separation of technology from its social effects. The separation emerged
in the early modern period and was a defining characteristic of moder-
nity. I have interpreted resistance by the Luddites in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries as resistance to that separation. They demanded
that those who introduced new technology anticipate its social effects.
To the Luddites and their sympathizers, technology did not inhabit a
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realm separate from its social, cultural, and political effects. This was
also the case for a larger part of the Rotterdam dockworkers at the turn
of the twentieth century. The socialist leaders and other members of the
elite, however, viewed technological developments as unavoidable and
could not perceive viable alternatives. Environmental groups and other
protesters against the prospective expansion of Schiphol were more am-
bivalent. By attempting to formulate alternatives, they did not define the
contemporary plans for Schiphol’s expansion as unavoidable. But their
efforts were hampered by the absence of a language and space to create
alternative designs for Schiphol.
These social, cultural, and institutional liabilities make it clear why,
under the modernist regime, the technical is kept separate from the po-
litical. No wonder that it is so difficult to develop a new relationship be-
tween technology and the political realm. In this last section of my
chapter, I develop some ideas about how to overcome the bias of mod-
ernist technology politics that separates the technical and the social. In
doing so, my tone will become less descriptive (aiming at diagnosis) and
more prescriptive. Indeed, I aim to prepare intellectual ground for a new
kind of modernist technology politics, one that could be called “con-
structive technology politics.”15
To achieve such a constructive technology politics, it will be necessary
to nurture a new set of institutions and discourses that aim at broaden-
ing the design of new technologies to include societal actors and factors.
When such institutions proliferate, design processes will happen in new
networks and circumstances. Ultimately such a development would
allow for the constructive experimentation of technology and society.16
It is not constructive in the sense of avoiding conflict. Power games will
still be played; however, these will be partly displaced to other arenas,
and here affected persons and institutions will be in a position to take
responsibility for the construction of technology and its effects. By insti-
tutionalizing negotiation spaces (or nexus), both proponents and oppo-
nents will become responsible for giving meaning to technology and its
effects.
The view that design processes must be broadened is not based on any
presumption that social effects play no role in present design processes.
On the contrary, they are present in the form of (sometimes implicit) 
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assumptions about the world in which the product will function (Akrich
1992, 1995). The effect of broadening is that the designers’ assumptions
or “scripts” concerning their technologies17 are articulated as early as
possible to the users, governments, and other parties who will feel the
effects of the technology, and have their own scripts. At present, there is
no space for such an early exchange of contending scripts.
If the design process is broadened, it could acquire three beneficial
features: anticipation, reflexivity, and symmetrical social learning.18 In
the first feature, actors would organize the anticipated impacts on a con-
tinuous basis. Through reflexivity19 they would have the ability to con-
sider technology design and social design as an integrated process and to
act upon that premise. Finally, through symmetrical social learning, the
actors would learn about all aspects of a new technology simultane-
ously. The vision is of new technologies evolving through a mutual
learning process: technological options, user preferences, and necessary
institutional changes are not given ex ante, but are created and modified
along the way. Many historical and sociological studies have shown
how user demands and regulatory requirements are articulated and ex-
pressed during the development process itself, in interaction with the
technological options (Clark 1985; Green 1992). Producers gain new
perspectives on their technologies from their customers and in response
modify their designs.
In current design processes, mutual learning rarely takes place be-
cause of a prevailing tendency to optimize technology first, then check
for user acceptance, and finally examine regulatory fit. Of course, no de-
sign process is strictly linear, and most design schemes include planned
feedback. Feedback also arrives unexpectedly as problems discovered
during application force redesign. However, such adjustments rarely
change the pervasive assumption that design and development have to
focus first on optimizing a technology before specifying markets and 
detailing social effects.
Incorporating reflexivity, symmetrical learning, and anticipation in
design is not directed at substantive goals such as the reduction of envi-
ronmental pollution or the creation of more privacy. It does not even
lead to an argument about the desirability of such goals. The purpose 
of incorporating these features in design processes should be to shape
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technological development processes in such a way that social and tech-
nical aspects are symmetrically considered. However, it can be argued
that when design processes assume these features, fewer undesired (and
more desired) effects will result. By incorporating anticipation, reflexiv-
ity, and social learning, technology development becomes more trans-
parent and more responsive to the wishes of various social actors. They
will address the social effects that are relevant to them. Furthermore, in
a society where these new development processes have become the
norm, technology developers and those likely to be affected by the tech-
nology will be in a position to negotiate about the technology. An abil-
ity to formulate sociotechnical critique and contribute to design will
become widespread. Resistance to specific social aspects will not be
viewed as “technophobia,” but as an opportunity to optimize the design
to achieve a better fit in society.
The effect of breaking away from modernist management patterns
will not be to bring technology “under control” so that it plays a less
dominant role in society. Technology is not out of control. What will
change is the form of control and how technology development is
played out. The goal is to anticipate effects earlier and more frequently,
to set up design processes to stimulate reflexivity and learning, and thus
to create greater scope for experimentation. Winner (1977) asked for
more space for experimentation. His concrete proposals are a bit disap-
pointing, however; they consist of negative experimentation, that is, not
using a number of technologies. My proposal is for constructive experi-
mentation. Technologies need to be nurtured, but in a design process
that allows various actors to become engaged (see Smits 1997).20
Eventually this change will make technologies more open and more
flexible so users can easily control them. Technological development
will also become more complex. The variety of technological designs
probably will increase, for more groups will be addressed in their capac-
ity as knowledge producer and technology developer (Verheul and 
Vergragt 1995). More coordination and new competencies will be re-
quired. In some cases technical change processes will slow down. New
institutions will emerge to encourage negotiation among developers,
users, and third parties. Should design processes acquire the features of
learning, anticipation, and reflexivity, technologists will not suddenly
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see their work disappear or have it constantly evaluated by all sorts of
commissions. Most of the incremental design changes will not require
special negotiation at all, since social aspects will be included on a rou-
tine basis. They will be part of the technological “regimes” that orient
design and use (Rip 1995; Rip and Kemp 1998).
My call for new design practices extends beyond changing and/or im-
proving the design processes surrounding individual technologies. The
point is ultimately to change the way design is done in our modern soci-
ety. This change does not imply that the design activity itself needs to be
put up for discussion. Modern society—a society where there is room to
innovate and to create stable artifacts and networks—is accepted. Only
the design process is the object of change. To make that change, inspira-
tion can be sought in early Romantic thought, in which technology and
society are not pulled apart and in which individual autonomy and the
relevance of different rationalities held by different groups is accepted
and used as a resource (Blechmann 1999; Schwarz and Thompson
1990). The design process must make way for confrontation, power
struggles, ideological criticism, and the exchange of various rationalities.
Only then will anticipation, reflexivity, and social learning be well served.
Notes
1. I would like to thank Mikael Hård for his comments on an earlier version of
this paper and Tom Misa for his suggestions on revisions.
2. In recent philosophy of technology, it is common to make a distinction be-
tween instrumental and substantive positions; both result, however, in an analy-
sis that emphasizes that technical change is ruled by itself, that is, by norms of
efficiency and gradual and linear improvements to better systems (see Feenberg
1999a and Achterhuis et al. 1997.)
3. My technology-policy activities include working as an analyst for the Nether-
lands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research – Centre for Technology and
Policy Studies (TNO-STB), many consulting jobs for government agencies and
NGOs, as well as founding (along with Kurt Fischer in 1991) and participating
in the Greening of Industry network www.greeningofindustry.org.
4. The workers later were given the name “Luddites” after their legendary
leader Ned Ludd, who signed messages in the name of the workers. My interpre-
tation of the Luddites was first formulated in my thesis (Schot 1991). Recently, a
similar argument has been put forward by Nuvolari (1997). His paper has
helped me sharpen my arguments and views.
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5. See Nuvolari (1999), who cites R. L. Hills, “Hargreaves, Arkwright and
Crompton: Why Three Innovators?” Textile History 10 (1979) 114–126; com-
pare Berg (1985: pp. 236–239, 243).
6. Nuvolari (1999: p. 7) cites Randall (1991: pp. 82–83) and Rule (1986: 
p. 365) for the woolen case and the seminal work of Hobsbawm and Rude
(1969) on the Swing riot, Captain Swing.
7. See, for example, Rosenband (2000: p. 50): “Put another way, the state tech-
nicians’ and the entrepreneurs’ search for unfettered space, in which they could
manipulate technique freely, placed them on a collision course with the workers’
custom and the skills that undergirded it.”
8. Alder (1997: p. 302) even calls the decision to become neutral “the ur-event
in the relations between science and politics in the modern era. As many histori-
ans have noted, science as a profession and politics as a public activity both
came of age in France at the end of the eighteenth century. Yet after a brief pe-
riod of intense involvement, scientists (with very few exceptions) have generally
shied away from formal party politics.”
9. Notwithstanding the emerging consensus on an instrumental vision of techni-
cal change, various countries, regions, and industrial sectors did not follow an
identical industrialization path; industrialization was a varied and complicated
experience. In Britain and elsewhere craft production was highly innovative and
contributed to economic growth (Berg 1985). France followed a specific route
toward industrialization that was based more on skilled flexible small-scale in-
dustries producing a varied assortment of goods for large but constantly shifting
markets. This other route was thus a result of technology choices (see Sabel and
Zeitlin 1985; Mokyr 1990: pp. 113–148, 256–261). The same thing happened
in the Netherlands, where in a number of industries small-scale solutions were
preferred above mass-production technology. The Netherlands followed its own
distinct path too, mixing craft and mass production in a Dutch blend (Schot
1995, 1998). For the United States, typically cited as the Mecca of mass produc-
tion, Phil Scranton (1997) has emphasized the importance of smaller and
medium-scale enterprises (over mass-production formats).
10. For sources on the elevator controversy, see van Lente (1998a,b) and van
Driel and de Goey (2000, pp. 38–42).
11. Examples of such choices were elevators that would permit trade in sacks of
grain instead of large “bulk” grain loads; smaller elevators that allowed slower
discharge; elevators that allowed manual instead of automatic weighing. In ad-
dition, combinations of an elevator regime and a manual transshipment regime
were conceivable.
12. The notion of the need to regulate technology, albeit in a different way, is
also visible in the work of a number of philosophers who developed a substan-
tivist critique of technology: Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas. They do not
question the instrumental definition of technology, but only want to limit its 
application.
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13. For a detailed history of the Schiphol expansion, see Schot (1995) and
Bouwens and Dierikx (1996).
14. Such mediation forums are available for integrating constructed user needs
into design (see Schot and de la Bruhèze, forthcoming.)
15. In other publications, this kind of politics of technology is labeled “construc-
tive technology assessment” (Rip et al. 1995; Schot and Rip 1998).
16. See Weber et al. (1999) and Hoogma et al. (2002) for ideas on how to de-
sign constructive experiments.
17. I use a broad definition of designers, namely, technicians, managers, and
workers who are directly involved in the design process. In this respect Stauden-
maier (1989) has termed it a “design constituency.”
18. Note that these three features can also be transformed into management cri-
teria; that is, particular agencies could use them proactively in assessing and up-
grading design processes. For a elaboration of these criteria, see Schot (2001).
19. My notion of reflexivity is very different from the one used by Beck.
20. Such constructive experimentation is a form of neo-Luddism, but the nature
of this action is quite different from that implied in its use by a number of other
authors. Kirkpatrick Sale (1995) invites individuals to scrutinize any new tech-
nology for possible harm and if needed, reject it. No proposals are made to
change the nature of the design process itself. It is my conviction that this is pre-
cisely what the Luddites were after, while individual technologies per se were
not their main concern.
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